Consumers buying electronics products at the lowest prices on Shopper.com during 2000 and 2001 saved an average of 16 percent, compared to purchasing at the average listed price. Consistent with a variety of theories, the value of information depends on the size of the market. When two firms list prices, consumers save 11% by purchasing at the lowest price rather than the average price. These savings jump to 20% when more than 30 firms list prices. However, these potential savings accrue only to consumers on the "right side" of the "digital divide." JEL Numbers: D4, D8, M3, L13.
Introduction
Information has come a long way since the day that Nobel Laureate George Stigler noted it "...occupies a slum dwelling in the town of economics" (1961, p. 213). Today more than ever, information plays an increasingly important role in the lives of people around the world. The Internet, in particular, has transformed how goods and services are bought and sold between consumers (C2C), between businesses and consumers (B2C), and between businesses (B2B). Two Internet institutions have been especially influential in facilitating trade among market participants: electronic auctions and price comparison services. While there are important differences between these institutions, both provide price information. Information about prices is a valuable resource.
While it seems apparent that information on the Internet is valuable to those with access, it is virtually impossible to quantify all of the benefits the "information revolution" has brought consumers. Nonetheless, quantitative estimates of these benefits are necessary if one is to reasonably judge policy proposals for improving Internet access for those on the wrong side of the so-called "digital divide." This paper quantifies one small but measurable component of these benefits: the value of information provided by Internet price comparison sites. Our main finding is that consumers without access to such a site have to spend about 16% more for consumer electronics products compared to consumers on the right side of the digital divide.
The paper is motivated by a host of recent papers demonstrating that the prices of seemingly identical products sold on the Internet vary substantially even though it is allegedly very easy for consumers to engage in comparison shopping. For instance, Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2001) examined nearly 4 million price quotes for over 1,000 electronics products sold at the price comparison site, Shopper.com, and found that the average range in prices over an 8-month period spanning the years 2000 and 2001 was about $120, compared to the average selling price of $510. 1 Perhaps more surprising is that the observed price dispersion persisted over an 8-month period, despite the fact that consumers utilizing Shopper.com obtain a list of the prices that different merchants charge for the same product and, with a simple click of the mouse, can identify the merchant on the list that charges the lowest price.
As Internet markets mature, one would expect more and more shoppers and firms to use Internet price comparison sites. Indeed, between December 1998 and August 2000, the percentage of households in the US with Internet access increased from 26.2 percent to 41.5 percent. 2 According to the Census Bureau, there were nearly 10,000 1 Estimates of price dispersion for homogeneous products sold on the Internet vary widely. Studies that tend to find very high levels of dispersion in Internet markets include Bailey (1998a Bailey ( , 1998b Scholten and Smith (2002) . Recently, Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2001) provide evidence that these differences stem largely from differences in the numbers of firms listing prices for the products. 2 See the on-line document, "Falling Through the Net: Defining the Digital Divide," U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information, www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/digitaldivide/index.html.
consumer electronics retail establishments in the United States in 1997. 3 Each of these stores could, in principle, advertise their prices on price comparison sites such as Shopper.com. 4 The classical view is that maturing Internet markets will cause prices to decline toward marginal cost. 5 This view implies that the long-run value to consumers of the information obtained from price comparison sites will converge to zero: In the absence of any price dispersion, consumers can purchase goods at marginal cost irrespective of whether they utilize a price comparison site. is zero, when firms incur fixed costs to transmit price information, all firms do not 3 This figure is based on NAICS classification code 443112, which is comprised of establishments known as consumer electronics stores primarily engaged in retailing new consumer-type electronic products. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1997 Economic Census, January 5, 2001, p. 217. 4 This figure probably understates the actual number of potential competitors in on-line consumer electronic products markets, as the up-front cost to being an e-retailer is lower than being a "brick and mortar" retailer. 5 A number of recent papers have suggested that firms might avoid this outcome by price discriminating to take advantage of consumers' heterogeneities (Baylis and Perloff, 2002) or obfuscating price information (Ellison and Ellison, 2001 ). Recently, Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2001 Scholten ( , 2003 provide empirical evidence that the levels of dispersion observed at Shopper.com cannot be entirely explained by these considerations. 6 This assumes that arbitrage prevents firms from price discriminating among consumers who visit their firm directly and those who "click through" from a price comparison site. For a theoretical analysis of the impact of price discrimination on price dispersion, see . charge the same price in equilibrium. 7 Moreover, a profit-maximizing gatekeeper, such as Shopper.com, will charge positive advertising fees to induce the profit-maximizing level of price dispersion. 8 Section 2 shows that, in fact, a variety of oligopoly pricing models predict that different firms will continue to charge different prices for similar products even as
Internet markets mature. In other words, one should expect price dispersion as a long-run equilibrium even in the seemingly "frictionless" world of the Internet.
Moreover, these models predict that the value of the information provided by price two firms list prices, consumers save 11% by purchasing at the lowest price rather than the average price. These savings jump to 20% when more than 30 firms list prices.
From the standpoint of public policy and marketing, our results suggest that price comparison services such as Shopper.com, Nextag.com, and Kelkoo.com provide substantial value to consumers, and that this value will be enhanced over time as additional firms use e-tail distribution channels. However, this potential value accrues to consumers with Internet access and not to those on the "wrong side" of the "digital divide." We conclude in Section 4, and discuss some limitations with the present analysis and how these might be addressed in future research. There are several reasons to expect that the value of information might systematically depend on the number of firms listing prices at a price comparison site. First, in the classical competitive paradigm, an increase in the number of firms reduces the average price charged in the market. In the limit, competition forces all firms to charge the same price, so both Ep and Ep min converge to marginal cost and thus the value of information tends to zero as the number of firms gets large. Based on this, one might speculate that the value of information decreases as the number of firms listing prices increases.
Economic Models of Internet Pricing
Second, consider a naïve model where firms do not react to competitive forces and in which the distribution of prices is fixed. In this case, the average price will be independent of the number of firms, but the expected minimum price will decline as the number of firms listing prices increases. Thus, in this naïve setting, one would expect the value of information, V = Ep − Ep min , to be an increasing function of the number of prices listed at the comparison site.
Finally, the oligopolistic models discussed earlier in this Section imply that the equilibrium distribution of prices (and hence, the value of information) depends on the number of firms listing prices. For example, if we let n denote the number of firms listing prices and I denote the fraction of "informed consumers," the distribution of
imilar expressions may be derived for the Baye-Morgan and Narasimhan models.
One can show that, for both the Baye-Morgan and Varian models, the value of information is greater with many firms listing prices than with few firms listing prices. 10 The key point is that there are many reasons to expect the value of information to depend systematically on the number of firms listing prices:
For this reason, we will control for these potential effects in the results that follow.
Data, Empirical Methodology, and Results
We assembled a data set consisting of nearly 4 million price quotes for electronics products listed at Shopper.com. These data include daily prices for over 1,000 of the most popular electronics products listed between August 2000 and March 2001. While a more thorough discussion of the products covered and our collection methodology is contained in our companion paper (Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, 2001) , it is useful to highlight a number of features that make these data particularly useful for the issues at hand.
Shopper.com is not a shopbot that searches the Internet for prices of consumer electronics products. Rather, it is a database of the prices different firms charge for identical electronics products. Consistent with the assumptions of the Baye-Morgan model, firms pay Shopper.com for the privilege of listing their prices in this database.
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The only cost to a consumer using the site is the few seconds it takes to click on the appropriate product category (such as cameras or printers) or to enter the name of a specific product (such as a Nikon Coolpix 990 or an HP LaserJet 1100xi). Once this is done, Shopper.com returns a list of the current prices charged by each firm in its database that sells the product. Importantly, these prices are presented in a single list, so that even the relatively modest cost of searching different Internet sites for the best price is absent. 12 Furthermore, by simply clicking the "Price" heading, a consumer can sort the firms from lowest to highest price, thereby making it virtually costless to secure the lowest available price. Over the period sampled, we found that
Shopper.com provided more reliable price information than mySimon and other sites based on shopbot technologies. 13 Shopper.com's parent company, Cnet.com, was among the top 10 most visited web sites during the period in which these data were collected, and first among consumer electronics web sites. 14 Its next closest competitor at the time was mySimon.com, which Cnet acquired in March 2000. Its closest non-subsidiary competitor, Pricescan.com, was ranked 15th. Thus, Shopper.com is a high-traffic site where participating firms are serious enough about their e-retail presence to pay monthly fees to Cnet for the opportunity to list product prices in Shopper.com's database. 15 The authors of this paper have now purchased over 50 different products from low-priced merchants at Shopper.com, and in all instances the prices paid and products delivered met the advertised specifications exactly. Thus, unlike some markets where obfuscation, reputation, gray market goods, price discrimination, or bait-and-switch tactics play a dominant role in explaining price dispersion, 16 the Shopper.com environment would seem to approximate the institutional structure assumed in theoretical literature discussed in Section 2. 16 A host of papers show that these issues are important in many markets. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000b) find that shopbot technologies tend to weaken branded retailers, yet these retailers still have a 3.1% to 6.8% margin advantage over competitors. For other issues pertaining to branding, see Bergen, Dutta, and Shugan (1996) and Ward and Lee (2000) ; for bundling issues, see Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000) . Baye, Morgan, and find that the premium retailers are able to charge by participating in internal certification programs offered by Shopper.com vary with the number of other firms that use these services. For instance, when a single retailer is the only retailer participating in the certification program, it can charge a premium of about 20 percent. When more than three firms in a particular market use these programs or services, the premium vanishes. In an Internet auction environment, find that sellers with better reputations were more likely to sell the item being auctioned. find that reputable sellers on eBay earn a premium of about 7.6 percent. For a theoretical analysis of eBay-like reputation systems, see Dellarocas (2001) . Ellison and Ellison (2001) find that retailers selling computer memory employ loss leader or bait-and-switch tactics to increase profits. 17 Prices are exclusive of shipping costs. Elsewhere (Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, 2003), we provide evidence that shipping costs at Shopper.com are quite small compared to list prices, and do not vary much across firms. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any systematic relationship between shipping costs and list prices. listed price by "clicking a mouse," there is considerable dispersion in prices.
Value of Information
For each product k and date t in our sample, our data includes the number of firms (n kt ) listing prices for product k on date t and the prices charged by each of these firms. Lettingp kt denote the average price charged by the firms selling product k on date t, and p min kt denote the minimum price charged for product k on date t, one could
as an estimate of V (n). Table 2 An alternative approach permits us to make meaningful comparisons of the value of information across expensive and inexpensive products. In particular, our analysis is based on the following unit-free measure of the value of information for product k on date t:
This measure represents the percentage savings that a user of Shopper.com on date t enjoys by getting to purchase product k at the lowest listed price rather than at the average listed price. The last column of Table 2 More generally, Table 1 reveals that, averaged across all of the top 1000 products and all dates in our sample, the value of information provided by Shopper.com was 15.89 percent. This translates into savings of between $50 and $70 on a typical purchase. 18 The value of information exceeded 7.68 percent on over 75 percent of the product-dates, and exceeded 18.83 percent on 25 percent of the product-dates. until it again increases sharply when more than 20 firms list prices.
Econometric Results
Figures 1 and 2, in conjunction with correlations based on the data summarized in Tables 1 and 2 , seem to indicate that the value of information is greater when more firms list prices than when only a few do so. However, these tables and graphs do not account for dynamic changes in such key variables as the number of consumers or firms with Internet access, costs, reservation prices, or differences in products (such as product popularity). In order to control for these potentially important effects, we also used a simple econometric model to study the relationship between the value of information (V OI) and the number of firms listing prices for different products. We report results for a variety of specifications that attempt to control for unobserved differences in demand, costs, and market structure. These dummy variables include 229 time dummies (these date fixed effects control for unobserved changes over time in the number of potential firms, the number of consumers with Internet access, as well as changes in Shopper.com's fee structure) as well as product rank dummies (these fixed effects provide a crude control for cross sectional variation due to factors like differences in the popularity or age of products). 19 The econometric results from five different specifications are summarized in Table 3 . The second model in Table 3 adds product rank dummies to control for the impact of differences in product popularity on the value of information. This is motivated by the fact that parameters, such as reservation prices or inventory costs, can alter the distribution of prices and therefore the value of information. While the regression results for Model 2 reveal that it is indeed important to control for these effects, doing so does not qualitatively alter the finding that V OI is greater when many firms list the price of their product than when few firms do so. Model 5 is the most general specification. In addition to the 29 variables controlling for different numbers of firms, this regression includes 9 dummy variables to control for the effects of product popularity and also 229 dummies for each date in the sample to control for unobserved heterogeneity across product ranks and dates (the time dummies are suppressed in the table). Once again, even controlling for these cross-sectional and dynamic effects, the results summarized in Models 1 through 4 continue to hold. 20 Finally, it is interesting to note that, in all specifications reported in Table 3 that include product rank fixed effects, the coefficients on these product rank fixed effects are positive and statistically significant. Thus, controlling for dynamic and number of firm effects, we find that the value of information is lower for the most popular (top 100) products than for less popular products. This might stem from the presence of many other information sources (such as CNet Reviews, etc.) for these products, thereby making buyers of these products less inclined to infer quality from price.
Concluding Remarks
Over Our analysis is only a first step and has a number of potential limitations. First, we have assumed that price is the sole determinant of consumers' purchase decisions. To the extent that firms differ with respect to service (speed of shipping, return policies, restocking fees) or reputation, our estimates may overstate the value of information.
Second, we derived the value of information by comparing the lowest price listed for a given product to the average price for that product offered by firms listing on the comparison site. While this is consistent with economic models such as Varian (1980) , consumers lacking Internet access may sample an entirely different set of retailers.
If prices in conventional retail markets differ systematically from prices in online markets, our estimates of the value of information will be misstated. We note that the empirical evidence about such differences is mixed, with some researchers finding online prices to be higher than conventional retail (Bailey, 1998b) , some finding online prices to be lower (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000a) , and still others finding little difference between the two (Scholten and Smith, 2002) .
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